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Implications of Budget Reconciliation for 
Commodity Programs
James Richardson and Joe Outlaw
There appears to be a renewed emphasis in Washington
on reducing the federal budget deficit. Although the US
economy is improving, it appears that the only way to
make real progress in reducing the deficit is to reduce gov-
ernment expenditures.  The desire to reduce the deficit,
coupled with the President’s agenda that includes several
controversial and potentially costly items, has many in
Washington discussing the possibility of budget reconcilia-
tion for fiscal year 2005/06 after a budget resolution is
passed in 2005.
The details and intricacies of budget reconciliation are
far beyond the scope of this paper. In general, however, if
budget reconciliation happens, the budget committees will
send instructions to authorizing committees indicating the
amount of the required spending reductions relative to
baseline spending. It will then be up to the authorizing
committees (the agriculture committees in the case of
most agricultural programs) to decide what programs are
cut and by how much—as long as the required overall
reduction is achieved. At this point, there is only specula-
tion about what programs would be cut, but the agricul-
ture committees would have a wide range of programs to
choose from, including nutrition, export assistance, con-
servation, and commodity programs, to name a few.
Producers and their groups are having a hard time
accepting the prospects of cuts in program benefits. They
cite the fact that commodity program spending has been
less than projected by the Congressional Budget Office
(CBO) over the past few years due to higher actual prices
than were projected. In their mind, this results in savings
to the federal government, and they shouldn’t be asked to
take cuts. Unfortunately for producers, in the world of
budget scoring, lower payments due to higher commodity
prices do not represent budget savings.
The purpose of this paper is to discuss a few of the
alternatives available to the agriculture committees for
achieving budget reductions from commodity programs.
The three primary mechanisms used to provide support to
covered crops produced by US farmers are the countercy-
clical payment program (CCP), the marketing loan/loan
deficiency payment program (ML/LDP), and direct pay-
ments (DP). The fact that these programs are interrelated
has the potential to create additional issues that should be
addressed prior to implementing changes to avoid unin-
tended consequences (Table 1).
A hypothetical example is provided assuming that a
10% reduction in March 2004 CBO baseline spending
levels is required over the 2005–2014 period. To project
budget savings, a stochastic simulation model was devel-
oped to imitate the CBO budget scoring process and the
results of achieving savings by implementing reductions in
target prices, loan rates, direct payment rates, and the pay-
ment fraction. CCPs and ML/LDPs are received when the
market price is less than the program’s respective trigger
level. As a result, a deterministic model, which uses mean
prices, fails to score reductions in target prices and loan
rates as a budget saving. A stochastic model, on the other
hand, simulates the full distribution of prices, so any
decreases in target prices and loan rates result in budget
savings. It should be noted that changes could also be
made to payment limits to achieve budget savings
(although this paper does not consider payment limits).
The example will discuss the consequences of (a)
reducing target prices that would reduce CCPs; (b) reduc-
Table 1. Impact of a decrease in current farm policy 
instruments on CCPs, DPs, and ML/LDPs.
Policy tool CCP DP ML/LDP
Reducing target price Decrease No change No change
Reducing loan rate Increase No change Decrease
Reducing direct payment rate Increase Decrease No change
Reducing payment fraction Decrease Decrease No change44 CHOICES 4th Quarter 2004
ing the direct payment rate that
would reduce DPs; (c) reducing loan
rates that would reduce ML/LDPs;
and (d) reducing the 0.85 payment
fraction used in the calculation of
DPs and CCPs—essentially lowering
both of these payments.
2004 CBO Baseline
The CBO develops baseline budget
projections to give Congress a base-
line to measure the effects of pro-
posed changes in law against (CBO,
2002). For agriculture, CBO projects
government expenditures, by pro-
gram and crop, assuming a continua-
tion of the current farm bill for 10
years. As a point of reference, the
2004 CBO baseline, projected CCP,
DP, and ML/LDP payments for the
nine major program crops is about
$120.5 billion over the 2005–2014
period. Total DPs for nine crops
(corn, wheat, cotton, grain sorghum,
barley, oats, rice, soybeans, and pea-
nuts) is estimated at $49.7 billion,
whereas CCPs and ML/LDPs are
$36.7 billion and $29.1 billon,
respectively. It should be pointed out
that current projections of market
prices over the next few years are sig-
nificantly lower than were projected
in the example baseline (2004 CBO
March baseline). This means that the
2005 CBO baseline that will be used
for measuring savings will likely have
significantly greater projected CCP
and ML/LDP expenditures.
For this paper, the stochastic bud-
get scoring model was optimized
using optimal control theory to esti-
mate the decreases in target prices,
loan rates, direct payment rates, or
payment fraction to achieve a 10%
budget savings. The model was opti-
mized once with an across-the-board
percentage change in a policy variable
(e.g., target price) to achieve the bud-
get savings. Next, the model was
optimized once for each commodity
to find the percentage decrease in a
policy variable (e.g., target price) to
achieve a 10% budget savings for
each crop.
Target Prices
Cutting target prices will reduce
CCPs. Countercyclical payments are
a safety-net payment triggered when
season average price falls below the
target price minus the direct payment
rate. The CCP is paid on a historical
yield (created in the 2002 Farm Bill)
and base acreage, which is then
reduced by the 0.85 payment frac-
tion.
Using the 2004 CBO Agriculture
baseline, it is estimated that a 4.5%
cut in target prices would result in a
10% savings in government pay-
ments for the nine program crops
over the 2005–2014 period. The
problem with an across-the-board cut
of target price is that it may not be an
equitable way to achieve a budget
reconciliation spending cut. The
2004 CBO baseline indicates that
corn, wheat, and rice receive 30–
33% of their payments from the
CCP. In comparison, soybeans
receive only 14% of total payments
from CCPs, while peanuts and cot-
ton receive more than half of their
payments from CCPs. An across-the-
board cut in target prices to achieve
budget reconciliation instructions to
cut spending would negatively
impact soybeans, wheat, rice, and
corn relatively more than cotton and
peanuts. In other words, an across-
the-board cut reduces the expendi-
tures for some commodities more
than others. Is this equitable?
Direct Payment Rate
Cuts to the direct payment rate
would reduce DPs but increase
CCPs. As the direct payment rate
decreases, the CCP rate increases (in
the absence of a change in the target
price). Recall that the CCP rate
equals target price less the direct pay-
ment rate minus the greater of the
season average price and the loan
rate. As a result, cutting the direct
payment rate offers only limited ben-
efits to meeting a budget reconcilia-
tion target, because rising CCPs
offset DP cuts. Based on the 2004
CBO baseline for 2005–2014, it is
estimated that a 50% cut in direct
payment rate only saves 3% of
spending to nine program crops, and
cutting direct payment rates to zero
only reduces federal spending for
program crops by 5% because of
increases in CCPs.
Additionally, the DP is a certain
payment, whereas CCPs are risky.
Therefore, cutting the direct pay-
ment rate to zero to achieve a 5%
budget savings reduces producers’
utility. Producers would lose $49.7
billion of certain DPs to gain access
to uncertain CCPs. Another concern
about cutting direct payment rates is
that the DP is a decoupled payment,
which was not included in the WTO
cotton case brought against the
United States by Brazil (see Mercier
paper, in this issue).
Loan Rate
R e d u c i n g  t h e  l o a n  r a t e  w i l l  r e d u c e
ML/LDPs and increase CCPs (in the
absence of other changes). To the
extent that loan rates exceed produc-
ers’ expected prices, loan rates
encourage increases in supply. So, a
reduction in loan rates can be
expected to reduce the production
over which ML/LDPs are paid. How-
ever, as the loan rate falls, the maxi-
mum CCP rate increases. Using the
2004 CBO baseline, it is estimated
that a 17% cut in loan rates for the
nine major program crops would
reduce government payments to
these crops 5%. (Note that this calcu-4th Quarter 2004 CHOICES 45
lation ignores the supply response of
lower loan rates.) With 17% lower
loan rates, CCPs would rise about
$10 billion—more than offsetting
the $4.7 billion decline in ML/LDPs.
This leads to the conclusion that cuts
in loan rates are not a feasible option
for reducing spending on the nine
program crops.
Equity issues would also occur
with cuts in the loan rate. In the
2004 CBO baseline, cotton receives
only 2% of its government payments
from ML/LDPs, whereas soybeans
receive 53% of their payments from
LDPs. Corn, wheat, and rice receive
about 20% of their payments from
ML/LDPs. Therefore, an across-the-
board percentage cut in loan rates to
meet budget reconciliation instruc-
tions to cut spending would mean
soybeans would be footing most of
the required budget savings for other
crops (corn, wheat, rice, and cotton).
Payment Fractions
A payment fraction of 0.85 is used to
reduce the DP and CCP by 15% in
the 2002 Farm Bill. Cutting the pay-
ment rate fraction is a simple way to
reduce government payments.
Reducing the payment rate fraction
from 0.85 to 0.74 would yield an
estimated 10% reduction in govern-
ment payments for the nine program
crops over the 2005–2014 period.
Producers would probably dislike this
approach, because it reduces the cer-
tain DPs, and it makes some crops
pay less than their share of the budget
cuts. Cotton and peanuts receive
about 97% and 89%, respectively, of
their government payments in the
form of DPs and CCPs, whereas soy-
beans receive only 47% of their pay-
ments from DPs and CCPs. Rice,
corn, and wheat receive roughly 80%
of their government payments from
DPs and CCPs, so they would not
prefer cuts in the payment fraction
rate. Soybean producers, however,
may prefer this method of achieving
a budget reconciliation reduction,
because they receive a relatively
smaller portion of their government
payments from CCPs and DPs.
Summary
Under the 2004 CBO baseline, the
projected CCP, DP, and ML/LDP
program payments for the nine major
crops is $120.5 billion over the
2005–2014 period. It is anticipated
that Congress will pass a budget rec-
onciliation bill in 2005 requiring the
House and Senate Agriculture Com-
mittees to comply with the budget
reconciliation guidelines. The provi-
sions of the 2002 Farm Bill make it
difficult for the agriculture commit-
tees to cut payments by simply cut-
ting target prices, loan rates, or direct
payment rates.
A cut in the direct payment rate
or cut in the loan rate increases
CCPs. Cutting the payment fraction
is the easiest tool to use, but it
reduces both DPs and CCPs, making
farmers worse off than simply cutting
target prices and reducing an uncer-
tain government payment.
Across-the-board cuts are easier
to manage but raise significant equity
issues. Cuts in loan rates put the bur-
den of budget savings for the whole
farm bill disproportionately on com-
modities that benefit more from
LDPs. Similarly, cuts in target prices
put a greater burden on a different
group of commodities. To reduce the
impacts of equity issues, the agricul-
ture committees may need to con-
sider reducing policy variables
differently for each of the commodi-
ties.
A common ground that all pro-
gram commodity producers share is a
preference for DPs over CCPs and
LDPs. Expected utility theory sug-
gests that decision makers prefer a
certain income over a similar but
uncertain income. Any policy change
that reduces DPs so farmers have to
rely more on LDPs and CCPs will be
met with disfavor.
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